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THE PETA AND MY RELATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE: 
A CORRECTION OF SUKARNO1S AUTOBIOGRAPHY*
Raden Gatot Mangkupradja
I was lying in bed feeling the effects of the medicine re­
cently injected into my body by Dr. Sie Wie Boo. Suddenly there 
was the voice of a guest, and after knocking at the door Brother 
Rasiban came into my room.
He took a seat near my bed, and after inquiring as to my 
health he said, holding up a volume, "Well, Pak Gatot, I!ve just 
received this book--Bung Karnofs autobiography— from my son 
Supena. Please read it, Pak Gatot, and see if what Mrs. Cindy 
Adams has written is correct. And . . . above all see if what 
Bung Karno has told her is true. Your name is often mentioned 
in the book."
"Brother Rasiban," I said. "Ifve heard of this book before 
and of my name often being mentioned in it. But I’ve never seen 
a copy, let alone read it. How could I possibly afford a book 
which costs two hundred and twenty-five rupiah?' Thank you for 
it anyway," I added, "I’ll read it."
On that day, however, I did not feel at all like reading; 
only on the next did I begin. As usual, I skimmed through the 
book, skipping the pages which did not catch my attention, before 
I settled down to a more careful reading. From this superficial 
glance I was able to see that Bung Karno had not told the en­
tire truth. He had put forward as facts things he had only made 
up, and he had exaggerated in places. Indeed, he had gone so 
far as to distort facts, one of which deeply disturbed me.
In Chapter 22, "What Price Freedom," Bung Karno unashamedly 
stated that he completed his working program by setting up the 
PETA;1 and elsewhere he said that he had proposed me, Gatot 
Mangkupradja, to the Japanese to start the PETA. Frankly speak­
ing, I was deeply hurt by this unreasonable claim. I had re­
garded Bung Karno as a great man, and it was unbelievable to me *1
* As readers may be unfamiliar with the period of Indonesia’s 
history described in this account, the editors have supplied 
footnotes explaining some of the terms used and incidents 
referred to.
1. Sukarno actually says that the setting up of the PETA com­
pleted the second part of his working program, i.e., the 
arming of the people (p. 186).
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that he should have been so extraordinarily selfish as to claim 
for his own what others had done. I do not mean to boast. Far 
from it. Nor do I want praise and honor. I do not want to be 
called a leader or a hero; I would rather have had no mention 
whatever of my name and of PETA in Indonesia^ history. But I 
do not want anyone else to claim as his own work what I myself 
did, not even if that person were a general or a commander-in- 
chief or a president or a king. The proposal to set up a volunteer 
"Fatherland Defence Corps" and a "Hizbullah Corps" was one I 
made to the Japanese military regime through its general staff, 
the Sambo Beppan,2 and I staked my life on its success. I did 
this because I did not wish to see conscription introduced into 
Indonesia, as had been proposed by the Djawa Hokokai,3 which, 
under the leadership of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta, had sent in 
a petition to that effect to General Harada.4
It is only in order to counter the distortion of historical 
fact regarding the Fatherland Defence Corps that I resolved to 
write this correction. I write it not to degrade Bung Karno, 
but to place the historical facts in their proper perspective.
My humble greetings to the Reader, 
Gatot Mangkupradja
Bandung, 20 April 1967.
The Independence Movement
I was born in Sumedang on December 15, 1898. My father was 
a very well-known doctor in the Priangan, Raden Mohamad Saleh 
Mangkupradja. At the time of my birth he was fulfilling his 
contract as government doctor for the civilian and military 
population; after completing his service in 1910 he practiced 
medicine in Bandung. He became famous because, in addition to 
using pharmaceutical medicines and drugs in his practice, he 
also employed materials derived from herbs growing in Indonesia.
2. Sambo Beppan, better known as the Beppan, was the Special 
Task Unit within the 16th Army HQ which was responsible for 
counter-intelligence and special operations. It was headed 
until July 1945 by Lieutenant-Colonel Masugi.
3. Djawa Hokokai was the last and most effective of the mass 
organizations instituted by the Japanese for the mobiliza­
tion of the population of Java behind the war effort. It 
was set up in March 1944.
4. Lieutenant-General Harada commanded the 16th Army occupying 
Java from November 1942 to April 1945.
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He made experiments and left behind a good many recipes, which 
I have kept until now. He earned so much money as a doctor 
that he was able to buy houses, ricefields, and other real 
estate; he even ran a long-distance taxi service which estab­
lished connections with the railway line that ran between 
Tandjung Sari, Tjirebon, and Kadipaten. On his death, my father 
left a large estate, which was divided among his six children.
In 1905 I began a Dutch-style primary education (Europeesche 
Lagere School) in Bandung. I finished in 1913, and the same year 
I began my studies at the school for Indonesian doctors (STOVIA) 
at Weltevreden, now a part of Djakarta. Once there I became 
a leader in the Langen Siswa Weltevreden and also joined in set­
ting up the Pagujuban Pasundan, together with other Sundanese 
STOVIA students, among them Kusumah Sudjana, Djundjunan, Slamet, 
Hidajat, Kusma, Daeng Ardiwinata, and E. Purawinata.
I left the STOVIA at the third form, and in 1917 began to 
study at the senior high school (HBS) in Bandung. There I was 
active in the Bond Inheemsche Studeerenden, under the leadership 
of Brother Wiwoho. This group united student organizations of 
the OSVIA (school for Indonesian administrators), Kweekschools 
(teacher training schools), and the HBS; it fused into Jong Java 
in 1920. I pursued my HBS studies also to the third form, and 
in 1922 I began to work in the railway service under the admin­
istration of Ir. F. Querin den Hollander, a very kind and prudent 
engineer, who was extremely nice to me.
I might point out here that the picture Bung Karno gives in 
his autobiography of relations between the Dutch and Indonesians 
seems to me much exaggerated. He said, for example, that Dutch 
children liked to spit at him. This is unlikely: the Europeans
disapproved very much of spitting, and when any of us school- 
children spat, the others would say "Foei” (Fie!). Moreover, 
he is not right in saying that Dutch pupils did not have to pay 
school fees; all school-children did, both Indonesians and 
Dutch, unless they were considered ’’badly off."
Bung Karno also claimed that he had once proposed to marry 
the daughter of a Dutchman, Mr. Hessels, who not only dismissed 
him rudely but also insulted him. I think this story was made 
up by Bung Karno to indulge his hatred of the nation which once 
dominated Indonesia. How could a boy still studying at HBS 
ask for a lady’s hand? If he did so, as he described, one would 
not blame Mr. Hessels for being angry. A young woman is not 
merchandise; the parents should first be well acquainted with 
their future son-in-law. Especially among the Europeans or 
Eurasians there must first be a period of engagement, and this 
only after the parents of the two parties have approved of it.
The proposal of marriage should be preceded by the parents’ 
agreement and then should be made in a formal way and not like 
buying something from a store. Bung Karno’s statement only shows 
he did not know etiquette, and Mr. Hessels’ response most probably
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was: ”Zeg, jongeman, wie ben je?” Wie zijn je ouders? Ken je
geen manieren? Er uit— ga uit mijn oogen, voor er wat gebeurt—  
onbeschofte kerel.” (I say, young man, who are you? Who are 
your parents? Don’t you know your manners? Get out— out of my 
sight, before something happens— impudent rascal.!t)
Bung Karno also said that Dutch youngsters did not pay the 
least attention to their Indonesian classmates, and when they 
did it was only to speak rudely to them. This is not true. I 
myself associated with boys and girls of both Dutch-Indonesian 
and full Dutch blood, and we all got along well together. I 
remember that around 1921, after I had left the HBS in Bandung, 
several Dutch friends of mine who had continued their studies at 
the Technical School (now the Bandung Institute of Technology) 
wanted to visit the sugar factory in Kadipaten together with 
their professors. Some students came to my house and asked me 
to join them, as they knew that I had my own car; and of course 
I went with these future engineers to Kadipaten. In 1927 I 
met a former classmate, Haga, who had sat at the same desk in 
school with me; he had become head of a Residency in Central 
Java. I also met up again with an old friend, Frits James, who 
had become the manager of a sugar factory at Djatipiring. Ifll 
mention, too,Ir. Bosman, president-director of BPM, who warmly 
received me at his house at Gambir SH- in 1953 , eight years after 
the proclamation of Indonesian independence; he still regarded 
me in the same friendly way he used to. I had the same cordial 
relations with Dalmeyer from the BPM, who is now living in The 
Hague. There were many among the Dutch who gave support to the 
Indonesian struggle for independence: I could name Meyer,
Sleebos, Chateline, Ir. Wiedenhoff, De la Fosse, Everts, Jhr. 
van der Goest, and Koperberg, all of whom held important posi­
tions .
In the railway service, I worked as a senior clerk. I be­
longed to the railroad workers’ union, VSTP, which the Communist 
leader Semaun headed. The trouble in 1923 which Bung Karno 
mentions as receiving so much attention in the newspapers was 
not, incidentally, Hadji Hassan’s incident in Garut as he says, 
but the VSTP strike that took place that year. The police were 
busy searching for Semaun in Garut, as he had been living in that 
town, namely on Djalan Pangampaan in the house of my uncle, who 
worked as a teacher of signals in the railway service in Bandung 
at that time. After the strike I was moved to Djakarta, where 
I worked for the railroad inspectorate.
In 1926 family matters compelled me to ask for my resigna­
tion from the railway. I did not have to work to earn my living, 
my means of subsistence being more than sufficient because of 
the income from ricefields, real estate, and taxis. On my re­
turn to Bandung I became involved in the Study Club that had 
been established there by Indonesian nationalists. In 1927 I 
became a member of the Perserikatan (later Partai) Nasional 
Indonesia, which at that time had Mr. Usman Sastroamidjojo as
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its chairman, and Ribut at its secretary; the other executive 
members were Ir. Sukarno, Dr. Samsi, Ir. Anwari, Mr. Sartono, 
and Apandi Widadibrata. The following year I became secretary 
of the party, Ir. Sukarno was made chairman, Mr. Iskaq first 
secretary, and Mr. Sartono first treasurer. After that my per­
sonal relations with Bung Karno were close and I knew very well 
the state of his affairs.
There are a number of things which Bung Karno has claimed 
regarding the development of the nationalist movement which I 
believe are not true. For example, he says that one day in 
1922, when he was still a student at the Bandung Technical 
School, he cut his classes and went south of Bandung, where he 
met with a peasant. The peasant’s name was Marhaen, and it was 
from his conversation with this man that Bung Karno got the 
idea of "Marhaenism.,T This is not so. The term "Marhaen” was 
coined by Sukarno in 1928 after the establishment of the PNI.
At first the term Kromo had been much in vogue to refer to 
the common man; for women the term was Kasinem. Marhaenism 
was used specifically to distinguish between proletarianism, 
which is based on class struggle as taught by Marx, and the 
union of people of different classes fighting against colo­
nialism, as this was experienced in Indonesia. It meant the 
union of the whole nation, which is broader than just the 
union of the proletariat. The term "Marhaenism” only became 
popular, then, after 1928.
Bung Karno is also wrong in saying that one could not 
mention the name "Indonesia" or encourage others to do so.
There was no penalty attached to the use of that name. How­
ever, after the establishment of the Indonesian Party (Par- 
tindo), when Amir Sjarifuddin struck up the slogan "Indonesia 
Merdeka--Sekarang" (Indonesia Free, Now!) the word "merdeka,” 
free, was prohibited. That was after the 1932 Partindo 
congress at Gang Kenari in Djakarta. Again, Bung Karno said 
that he used the term "Guided Nationalism" in 1926. Actually, 
up to 1929, he used the term "Positive Nationalism," and 
after the establishment of the Partindo he used "Socio- 
Nationalism and Socio-Democracy," the term "socio-"having 
been taken from the ideas expressed by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro at 
the Taman Siswa congress in Jogjakarta.
Bung Karno also said that he had suggested uniforms for 
the nationalists. This, too, is not so. Indeed, he denounced 
the wearing of uniforms as resembling the practice of the 
Balilla troops of fascist Italy and the Hitler Jugend of 
Nazi Germany. Uniforms were worn by the Surya Wirawan forma­
tion of the Parindra, the JOP of Pasundan, and by the youth 
of the A1 Itihadiatul Islamiah in Sukabumi.
On October 29, 1928, Bung Karno said, he officially in­
stituted the slogan "One Nation, One Country, One Language."
In fact, the slogan was struck up by representatives at the
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congress of Indonesia Muda that year, led by Mohamad Yamin, 
Amir Sjarifuddin, Asaat Datuk Muda, Anta Permana, Yusuf Adi, 
Sukiman, A. K. Gani, and others. We of the adult group mere­
ly witnessed this and endorsed the slogan. The national 
anthem, "Indonesia Raya," was also introduced then, with some 
last-minute alterations. Just before the congress Rudolf 
Wage Supratman, the composer, and Mr. Sujudi (an enthusias­
tic piano-player; Supratman, like Sartono, played the violin) 
changed the 4/4 measure into 3/4 and later into 1/2. They 
also used the words "Indonesia Raja Merdeka Merdeka" instead 
of the original "Indonesia Raja--Indoja, Indoja."
Bung Karno says that he was the popularizer of the petji. 
Well, well!--hadnTt there been such a cap before Bung Karno 
wore it? The black velvet caps had been brought over by 
Malays via Padang and Palembang. First they became popular 
in the area of Djakarta and later in the interior, especially 
West Java, where by 1905 men had begun to have their hair cut 
and to wear the petji, which was also called the koptjah or 
kopiah. In Bandung, as far as I can remember, the wearing 
of this Malay cap was pioneered by the families of Tjik Hadji 
Abdul Sjukur, Tjik Hadji Adjis, and Hadji Anang Tajib, all 
wealthy jewel merchants. Afterwards the cap became popular 
among young men who were earning their living as traders and 
among the hadjis in the town of Bandung.
Some corrections should also be made in the description 
of the PNI organization by Bung Karno. He said, for one thing, 
that Bandung was divided into several organizational sectors. 
That is not correct: the city and regency of Bandung formed
one branch (tjabang). Below this were the sector (sektor), 
on the ketjamaton level, the local (ressort), equivalent to 
the village (desa), and finally the block (blok) or segment 
of the local.
Bung Karno claimed, in describing his activities in the 
PNI, that he often had to hold important secret talks in the 
back of an automobile. This is a fiction; although each of 
us was continually followed by two detectives and our houses 
were watched by police agents, there was no reason to hold 
conversations in the back of cars; it was perfectly possible 
to meet at home or in the office. It is also certainly not 
true, as Bung Karno claimed, that the PNI used a brothel for 
meetings and that in Bandung it had 670 members who were 
whores. The fact is that one or two reformed prostitutes 
who had married joined the PNI together with their husbands.
We were most cautious about admitting prostitutes and gamb­
lers , who might endanger the organization by giving it a bad 
name. Every member, man or woman, was screened, and as PNI 
secretary I always gave orders to the party commissioners to 
be very careful in their acceptance of candidate members.
Before admitting a person as a full member, he had to be a 
candidate for three months. Then he would be voted on after
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being checked by a committee consisting of the leaders of 
the branch, local, and block involved, and after being 
vouched for by two full members. Anyway, how could one 
unite and coordinate 670 prostitutes without one's fellow 
party members and other political rivals knowing?
As the party had not enough money to pay for its print­
ing, meeting-hall, and propaganda expenses, I gladly gave 
it financial support; and since I did not have other sources 
of income I gradually sold the wealth left behind by my 
father in the form of ricefields, real estate, and cars in 
Sumedang. From 1929 to 1931 I was imprisoned, having been 
arrested with Ir. Sukarno in Jogjakarta in December 1929.
I was amnestied in October 1931. When I got out of Suka- 
miskin jail I joined the Partindo and was appointed secre­
tary of its central executive and commissioner for the pro­
vince of West Java. In order to meet household and party 
expenses, I finally sold my favorite cars. In 1933, after 
Bung Karno had published his book Mentjapai Indonesia 
Merdeka, and the party had succeeded m  acquiring many young 
cadres, I asked to resign, and, as the needs of my house­
hold were urgent, I opened a pharmacy at Djalan Raya 22 in 
Bandung.
Regarding his period of exile Bung Karno said, "Don't 
let anyone dare say that he gave me financial support when 
I was at Endeh." Everything, he claimed, was a result of 
his personal effort. Why did Bung Karno say this? His 
friends who contributed to his support in the form of money 
or medicine sent to Mrs. Inggit Garnasih would not ask Bung 
Karno to pay back what they had given him. His statement 
implies that Bung Karno has abandoned his sense of gratitude 
towards his friends, country, and people for the sake of 
his personal fame and ambition.
After I opened the pharmacy, I began to have business 
relations with importers from Holland, Germany, and Japan, 
as I needed chemicals for medicine, wrapping materials, bot­
tles, boxes, and so on. Among others I had to do with 
Isamij (one of the Borsumij affiliates), Fa. Steinmetz (the 
agency for Bayer), Hirai, and Wakamoto Takeda. In October 
1933 I went to Japan, together with a group led by Mr.
Parada Harahap, in order to establish relations with Japan­
ese industrialists. And as things would have it, in early 
December that year the first Pan-Asiatic Congress was held 
in Tokyo, and I attended it by telling the committee that I 
was an Indonesian representative. At the congress I got 
acquainted with a number of leaders, among them Dr. Suzuki, 
the chairman of the congress, Genji Motsizuki of Kokumin 
Domei, Mr. Iwata of Minseito, and Mr. Ishihara, Marquis 
Tokugawa, and several generals, among them General Araki 
and General Itagaki. I also visited the home of Mr. Ras 
Behari Bose and the home of Mr. Sahai; and I met with Mr.
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Aguinaldo from the Philippines. I got the impression that the 
Japanese were seriously determined to see that Asia is for the 
Asians, and after my return to Indonesia I immediately made 
contact with the Japanese running shops in Bandung, Jogja, and 
Solo, and managing plantations in Garut and Tjiandjur.
The prospect of a Pacific War had always been used by the 
PNI as something to excite people at mass meetings; it was 
taken from an English magazine— if I am not mistaken the London 
News--which contained a book review of a work by an English 
admiral. In his book, the English admiral had guessed there 
would be an outbreak of war in the Pacific because of the 
struggle for power between Japan and the USA. In 1932 the 
Japanese had made a motion picture which showed the progress of 
their armed forces; it was preceded by a cartoon which showed 
an arm stretching out to grip Asia and this arm being shot away 
by a cannon from a warship flying the Japanese flag, the flag 
of the rising sun.
Although I did not take an active part in political organi­
zations when I returned, I was often seen visiting Japanese 
shops, and I therefore did not escape from the eyes of the 
political police. Often enough the police agents, among others 
Mr. Djanakum, Mr. Rachmat, and Mr. Sambas, would come to my 
store not only to buy medicine but to ask for my personal views 
on Japan.
In order to avoid unnecessary trouble I made up my mind to 
move to some other town, and my choice fell on Tjiandjur, where 
I opened a pharmacy, the Indische Kruidenhandel "De Erven van 
Dr. Saleh!T (Indies Herb Shop "The Heirs of Dr. Saleh"). I also 
established branches in Sukabumi, Purwakarta, and Bandung. In 
1935 I moved my family to Tjiandjur. We lived there at Bihbul 
in the desa of Nagrak, which was located in the middle of the 
ricefields about three kilometers from town. I had to live in 
the country, for the medicinal ingredients I dealt in had to 
be dried in the sun and then pounded. In town there was no 
yard large enough for drying the herbs while in the country­
side, among the ricefields, there was ample room for this.
I became chairman of the Tjiandjur branch of the Pagujuban 
Pasundan and concurrently served as vice chairman of the 
Tjiandjur Muhammadijah. I also made the acquaintance in this 
period of Mr. Takeomi Togashi, a Japanese storekeeper whose 
shop was situated next to mine on Djalan Raya, Tjiandjur. I 
was to have many acquaintances among the Japanese military, 
for a good deal of the Japanese who opened shops in Java were 
actually military personnel.
In 1942 the Pacific War broke out, and in March of that 
year the Japanese army landed in Java. One day we learned that 
the Japanese forces had entered Tjibeureum; the Dutch troops
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stationed at Tjirandjang and the British under General Shilling 
had retreated as far as Bandung. All of a sudden, several friends 
of mine came round and asked me to go to the Regent of Tjiandjur, 
as some Japanese officers disguised in Indonesian clothes had 
arrived at his place, among them my neighbor Mr. Togashi. On 
my arrival at the RegentTs residence I met Mr. Togashi, who 
introduced me to Lieutenant Yanagawa and to Captain Nagata, who 
was leading the Japanese troops together with Captain Shigeno.
Then and there, in front of many people, Mr. Togashi said, 1 Well, 
Mr. Gatot, before very long Indonesia will surely be free. Now, 
however, we are still at war; I hope you are prepared to help 
us." All who heard this became excited and cried, "Hidup, hidup! 
Merdeka, merdeka!" (Hooray, hooray! Liberty, liberty!), and 
shortly after that the people brought out Red-and-White flags, 
which they hung everywhere.
Mr. Togashi told me that he was going to Bandung straight 
away and that if I wanted to see him again I must come to the 
Concordia building in that city. Several days later, Brother 
Winoto came to me from Sukabumi and asked me to accompany him 
to Bandung. As I had been given a surat djalan (a letter or 
document issued to a person by the local military authority 
giving him permission to travel), by Captain Nagata* I went to 
Bandung by car together with Brother Winoto and several young 
men in order to meet Mr. Togashi and Mr. Yanagawa at the 
Concordia.
That afternoon Mr. Togashi invited me to his home on Djalan 
Wastukentjana (the mansion later occupied by the Siliwangi 
Division commander Ibrahim Adjie). In that house I was* intro­
duced to several more Japanese officers. In the evening after 
dinner I was brought in a car to Djalan Embong 17. This had 
been my home before I moved to Tjiandjur, and it was now occupied 
by my younger brother, Raden Gunawan, who worked for the radio, 
post, and*telegraph service.
The next day I returned to Tjiandjur. All of us had gotten 
surat djalan from Mr. Yanagawa, and at Tjiandjur I asked a 
Chinese to tell me what mine said, as it was written in Kanji.
The man, whose name was Wong Yun Kong, told me that it was a 
very important paper, for with it I* could go anywhere without 
being anxious about being detained by Japanese soldiers. From 
its* seal it was evident* that the officer who signed it was from 
the Sambo Beppan, a body which was more authoritative than the 
Kempeitai.5
I maintained my connections with the Sambo Beppar officers. 
Occasionally I spent the night in Bandung, if not on Djalan 
Wastukentjana then at Djalan Merdeka 28, the huge former residence
5. Military Police.
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of Dr. Weycherheld Bisdom, and Japanese officers often came to 
Tjiandjur. During the Japanese occupation my association was, 
therefore5 not with Japanese civilians but with military person­
nel. I was frequently invited to go with them to such places 
as Udjung Genteng, Pelabuhan Ratu, Tjisolok, Mira-Maree, and 
Djampang; I accompanied Lieutenant N. Narusawa particularly 
often.
Running a drugstore was now getting more and more difficult 
because it was hard to get pharmaceutical ingredients. The re­
sult was that my drugstores in Purwakarta, Sukabumi, and Bogor 
had to be closed down, while in Bandung only the one on Djalan 
Dalam Kaum remained open. Those that remained in business sold 
mainly traditional remedies (djamu). I began to earn my living 
instead by dealing in sheet rubber together with Brother A. A. 
Achsien. We shipped the rubber to Djakarta and Surabaja. It 
became harder and harder for people to survive as the Japanese 
military administration bought up the rice. The enthusiasm which 
had prevailed on the arrival of the Japanese army began to fade, 
especially when the Japanese civilians and private entrepreneurs 
joined in the administration and dominated the economy.
In 1942 I became local chairman of the AAA, which was led 
by Mr. Sjamsuddin; but it was soon dissolved by the Japanese.6 
About the middle of 1942 there was news that Bung Karno had 
been brought to Djakarta from Bengkulu by way of Padang and 
Palembang; he was asked to lead the Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat, 
or Center of Peoplefs Strength). In Tjiandjur, however, the 
Putera could not get under way, for after the dispersal of the 
AAA no one there would join any movement at all. I had already 
asked Mr. Yanagawa for information about the Putera, and he ad­
vised me not to join it. This seems odd, as it had been in­
spired by Beppan officers. However, the Shimizu group from the 
Gunseikanbu (Civil Administration) supported it and many from 
the Gunsireikanbu (Military Administration) group did not.7 On
6. The AAA or Triple-A was the first of the "mass" organizations 
set up by the Japanese on the island of Java. It was formed 
in April 1942 under the young Parindra leader Mr. Sjamsuddin, 
with the backing of the Japanese propaganda expert Shimizu.
It was replaced by the Putera organization in March 1943, 
though it had become defunct by October 1942. The name de­
rived from the three capital letters "A" in the well-known 
slogan of the movement: "Japan, the Leader of Asia, Japan,
the Protector of Asia, Japan, the Light of Asia."
7. The Gunseikanbu was actually the office of the Military Ad­
ministrator of Java, who was, throughout the occupation, the 
Chief-of-Staff of the 16th Army. It became the general term 
for the military administration of the island; many Japanese 
civilians, including Shimizu, served within it. The 
Gunsireikanbu was the 16th Army Headquarters, concerned with 
strictly military affairs. The Gunseikan served within the 
Gunsireikanbu in his capacity as Chief-of-Staff.
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hearing this advice, I contacted my friends in Sukabumi and Bogor 
and advised them not to join the Putera; and the result was that 
no Putera units were established in the regions of Bogor, 
Sukabumi, and Tjiandjur. Even after the Putera was changed 
into the Djawa Hcrhcrkai (also called the Pusat Kobaktian Rakjat, 
or Center of People’s Service) under the leadership of Bung 
Karno, Bung Hatta, Kiai H. Mansur, and K. H. Dewantoro, the 
Bogor Shu (Residency) remained without it.
News About the Proposal for 
Conscription m  Indonesia
Owing to the hard times, many young men joined the Heiho, 
or auxiliary troops directly under the Keibitai (Japanese army).8 
From the village of Nagrak several young men did this. After 
some time their families grew anxious, hearing nothing of them 
or their whereabouts. Their fears spread throughout the village.
I often asked Sergeant Hoshino, who was stationed in Tjiandjur, 
for an explanation, but he knoew nothing about ft.
About the beginning of September 1943, the Bandung newspaper 
Tjahaja published the news that while in Tokyo one of the Indonesian 
dignitaries then visiting Japan, Mr. Raden Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, 
had asked the Japanese government to institute compulsory military 
service in Indonesia in order to support Dai Nippon in its effort
to win the Greater East Asia War. A copy of the paper was brought
to my house in Bihbul by Brother R. Kuswaja Hardjakusumah and 
Brother Junus (Supervisor of Public Works). We could only regret 
Mr. Sutardjo’s proposal, which had been welcomed warmly in 
Bandung by the Regent, R. A. A. Wiranatakusumah, who even de­
clared himself ready to send two of his sons into the conscript
army. I found the plan in conflict with the teachings and views
of the Indonesian Nationalist Party on conscription. In the 
colonial period Bung Karno himself, while leading the PNI in 
Bandung, had argued against conscription on the grounds that:
(1) conscription is something forced upon a subject people;
(2) for an independent state, conscription is obviously beneficial, 
as it provides forces which can fight for the sake of the country;
(3) for a subject people, military service means supporting and 
reinforcing the position of the colonialists; (4) even though 
the young man is unwilling and his father forbids it, a conscript 
must join the army, and if he refuses he may be sentenced to two 
long years; and (5) conscript soldiers are under the regular army 
and may be sent abroad, away from their native land.
We discussed the matter among ourselves, and finally I de­
cided that it would be much better to suggest a system of volun­
tary military service, even though the fate of the young men who
8. The Keibitai were actually Garrison Guards.
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entered it might be no better than if they had been conscripted.
At least those who did not wish to enter would not be compelled 
to do so, and likewise, if parents were unwilling, their sons 
would not be taken away. For this reason I wrote a letter the 
next day to Mr. Raden Bratanata, the editor of Tjahaja, asking 
him to print my views objecting to the introduction of conscrip­
tion in the light of the fact that volunteer forces would be 
much more suitable for Indonesia. I wrote only briefly, with­
out elaboration.
The very next day after my letter was published, a soldier 
from the Sukabumi Kempeitai came to my house and asked me to 
accompany him to Sukabumi; there I was brought to the Kempeitai 
office and detained. As the Kempeitaicho9 and some of his sub­
ordinate officers knew that I had had much to do with SambU 
Beppan officers, I was not treated rudely. On the contrary, I 
was even quartered in the house of Sergeant Kobayashi. After 
several days I was interrogated by the Kempeitaichu, Mr. Ichizaki, 
with Mrs. Milbraadt Miller acting as interpreter. Among other 
things, he asked if I had written anything in the Tjahaja and 
whether I was unwilling to support Nippon or perhaps was even 
opposed to Nippon. I told him that I wanted to support Nippon 
and was not in the least against Nippon. I only preferred a 
volunteer corps, since during a war only very brave young men 
joined armies of their own free will.
I then told him that after the war in Europe had broken 
out in 1939, the Netherlands East Indies administration had set 
up various forces in Java: (1) a territorial militia (Land-
wacht); (2) a city militia (Stadswacht); (3) a volunteer train­
ing corps (Vrijwilliger Oefencorps, VOC); (4) a corps of reserve 
officers (Korps Reserve-Officieren, KORO); (5) an emergency mili­
tary academy; (6) an air raid alert service (Luchtbeschermings- 
dienst); (7) air raid protection organizations for rural areas, 
run by the civil administration and police; and (8) a system of 
conscription (militieplicht). I myself, I said, had been 
appointed deputy head of the air raid protection organization 
in the town of Tjiandjur under the leadership of Mr. Lodens.
Its central office had been headed by Mr. van der Wetering. I 
said that all of this had been forced on the Indonesians by the 
Dutch. Thus, when the Japanese soldiers landed on Java our peo­
ple had everywhere thrown away their guns and uniforms and 
headed back to their villages. Together with the assistant 
wedana of Tjugenang and Tjikalong, I had collected the carbines 
which they had thrown away in the tea plantations at Kiarapajung, 
Tjimatis, and Tjugenang. That was the reason why I had asked 
for volunteers and not for conscripts. The Kempeitaicho nodded
9. Kempeitaichcr--chief of the local branch of the Kempeitai. It 
should be noted that the Kempeitai and the Beppan formed sepa­
rate hierarchies within the military, often in rivalry with 
one another.
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musingly and then made a telephone call, to whom I do not know.
Early in the afternoon I was taken back home to Tjiandjur. 
There I was surrounded by many friends and neighbors, who asked 
me how I felt. They all thought I had been tortured. I also 
learned that after I had been taken away to Sukabumi my wife had 
immediately gone to Bandung and visited Mr. Togashi to ask his 
help. The next day I received a telephone call from Regent R. A. 
Abbas Surianata Atmadja, saying that I was asked to go to Djakarta 
to meet Mr. M. Yanagawa at his office.
That very day I said goodbye to my wife and set off for 
Djakarta. I went to stay at the house of Mr. R. Mohammad Jasin, 
chief of the Djakarta police, who lived at Djalan Kramat 11.
The following day I went to the Beppan office at Gambir 64, 
where I found Mr. Yanagawa and other Japanese officers already 
waiting for me. They brought me to Major-General Sato, the 
chief of staff, who was meeting with some of his officers. 
Major-General Sato asked me the same questions that had been 
posed by the KempeitaichO' at Sukabumi, and I gave the same 
answers. He then asked me whether I would be prepared to re­
ceive my punishment, if no one was willing to join the volun­
teer forces.
On leaving home I had determined to bear all the consequences 
of my stand, as I wanted to see Indonesian youths saved from com­
pulsory induction into the army. If they became victims of their 
own free will it was a different matter. At that time I only 
wanted to prevent coercion. After a lengthy interrogation, I 
was finally allowed to return to the home of Mr. Mohammad Jasin, 
but was told to present myself again at the office the next day.
I was taken home in a car by Mr. Nagashima, a junior officer 
who was already very good at Indonesian. On the way he confided 
to me that Lieutenant Yanagawa was very much in agreement with 
the formation of a volunteer force as I proposed, but that 
several officers were still doubtful.
The next morning, having arrived at the Beppan office again,
I was asked to call on Major-General Sato. He told me that he 
understood my intentions, and asked me to write letters of re­
quest which would be sent to the Gunseikan Kaka and the Gun- 
sireikan Kaka. I was then taken to the office of Captain 
Maruzaki, where pen and ink had been prepared for me. In front 
of Lieutenant Yanagawa and Captain Maruzaki, I once more stated 
the seriousness of my proposal and my personal dedication to 
the establishment of the volunteer corps.10 And in order to 
prove to them my personal dedication I pricked my left arm with 
the pen until it bled and then with this blood I wrote a letter 
of request to the Government of Dai Nippon in Tokyo.
10. Maruzaki and Yanagawa were both original members of the 
Beppan.
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Who Was M. Yanagawa?
Mr. M. Yanagawa was a Japanese officer who, when he came 
to Java, was a first lieutenant. He belonged to the members 
of the General Staff who were first landed on Java via Merak, 
together with Mr. T. Togashi, my Japanese friend who had lived 
in Tjiandjur, and Captain Nagata. It was he and his staff who 
cleared the way for the Nipponese forces via Leuwiliang, Patjet, 
Tjibeureum, and Tjiandjur up to Bandung. I first got to know 
him during the invasion of Tjiandjur. Thereafter I often came 
to his residence on Djalan Wastukentjana in Bandung; Mr. Togashi, 
too, often invited me to his office at the Sambrr Beppan head­
quarters on Djalan Wastukentjana.
I did not concern myself then with Mr. YanagawaTs official 
position or function, but came to his house in order to pay him 
a social visit or to have a meal. One day he told me that he 
was moving to Djalan Merdeka where Mr. Tjusumi and Mr. Narusawa 
were also staying. So I became well acquainted with these gentle­
men, who often called on me at home in the hamlet of Bihbul on 
their way to Djakarta.
On a later visit to Bandung, I saw Indonesian youths in the 
spacious backyard of the house where Mr. Yanagawa was staying. 
According to Mr.Narusawa, he had started to give these young men 
military training. I did not attach importance to this at the 
time. However, one day Mr. Yanagawa elaborately explained to 
me that he was seriously interested in the Indonesians1 desire 
for national independence and that he was prepared to lend his 
support to it. We then began to talk about the Indonesian 
independence movement. I told him that I had once been to Japan 
and had joined in the Pan-Asiatic Congress in Tokyo. I also 
told him that I had acquaintances among the circles of the Pan- 
Asiatic movement.
Mr. Yanagawa frankly and openly explained that not all 
Japanese were of one opinion on the matter, but he himself 
wanted very much to help. He said that in order to achieve 
their desire for national independence, the Indonesian people 
had first of all to be made strong and possess a great, flaming 
spirit. Since Mr. Yanagawa could not speak Indonesian well, it 
was very difficult for him to explain what he felt; but I was able 
to see that he greatly regretted the fact that among the Indone­
sians there were many who were weak and poor-spirited with little 
"seizin." They had to be aroused.
Mr. Yanagawa also explained that Indonesia had to possess 
a strong army of her own. For me, this statement of his was 
most unclear. How could Indonesia acquire her own army, when 
she had been under the domination of a foreign power so long?
Those who did become soldiers had always served as subordinates, 
and power remained in the hands of those who ruled.
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One day Mr. Narusawa came to Tjiandjur and asked me to help 
him look for some young men who were willing and able to undergo 
military instruction in Bandung. I promised to do so, and from 
several ketjamatan I sent a number of young men to Bandung for 
basic training at Djalan Merdeka. I had no further interest in 
this training effortsometimes when in Bandung I joined in and 
sometimes I simply looked on. Each of us went his own way. I 
devoted myself to small business, until one day Tjahaja published 
the news of Mr. Sutardjo KartohadikusumoTs proposal for conscrip­
tion and I responded as I have related above.
Thus, when I proposed the formation of the Volunteer Army 
for the Defense of the Fatherland (Tentara Sukarelawan Pembela 
Tanah Air, PETA) at the Beppan office at Gambir 64, Djakarta, 
two ideas met. I proposed the formation of the PETA because 
my conscience could not approve of compulsory military service 
for Indonesia; and Mr. Yanagawa saw in my proposal a way to 
bring about his ideal of an army that would enable Indonesia 
to defend herself. This was why Mr. Yanagawa immediately gave 
his full support to my petition to form the PETA.
After my proposal had been accepted by the Japanese govern­
ment and its execution authorized, Mr. Yanagawa and his staff 
arranged all matters of administration, organization, tactics, 
and strategy, including the formation of the three Igokimmutai 
and even the setting up of the Hizbullah force. All important 
roles were wholly in the hands of Mr. Yanagawa (he was by then 
a Captain) and his staff; I merely served as proposer, promotor, 
and sometimes as assistant.
Frankly, I must confess that as, a soldier, Mr. Yanagawa 
was more far-seeing than I was in welcoming and later in serving 
the cause of Indonesian independence and nationhood. I gave too 
much emphasis to the strength of masses, relying on their flaming 
spirit and zeal to carry out the independence struggle, while 
Yanagawa, in addition to the strength of the masses, relied on 
creating a core force of steeled discipline and skill in matters 
of war, which could produce, maintain, and develop Independence. 
This core force was to be the "pushing power" which would bring 
forth leadership and undying zeal. This idea became a reality 
during our struggle against the Dutch. Without this core force, 
Leader and Provider of a Steeled Spirit, the civilians could not 
have prevailed against the Dutch. It was thanks to the endurance 
of the Armed Forces that the Dutch were finally forced to trans­
fer sovereignty to the Indonesian people. And this has to be 
recognized by the Indonesian politicians.
After the formation of the PETA, which was called Buei 
Giyxrgun in Japanese, Mr. Yanagawa and I continued our cooperation 
on a basis of mutual understanding. After the Japanese surren­
dered, we met again at the internment camp at Benda, and again 
at the Glodok prison. Whenever anyone mentions the PETA, he 
should remember the name of Captain M. Yanagawa, who was its
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guiding spirit. He is still alive, and, as one who never for­
gets a friend, has been to my house in Bandung several times.
Something Quite Unknown to Many People
When I submitted my proposal for setting up the PETA and 
received full support from Sarnbu Beppan officers, especially 
Mr. Yanagawa, Captain Maruzaki said he still had doubts as to 
whether many people would join the volunteer army. His per­
sonal experience on landing at Merak and passing through 
Leuwiliang, Djasinga, Bogor, and the Puntjak had been that the 
Netherlands Indies soldiers retreated, many of them taking off 
their uniforms and throwing away their weapons. A bet was 
therefore made between Mr. Maruzaki and Mr. Yanagawa, which 
was:
If the Bi^ ei Giyugun proved to be a success,
Mr. Maruzaki would cut off one of his own 
fingers and vice versa.
When the PETA proved indeed to be a success, Mr. Maruzaki, wit­
nessed by his fellow officers, cut off his little finger with 
his own Samurai sword.
The Status of the Volunteer Troops
After I handed over my petition to the Japanese government 
in Djakarta, I went to the editor of Indonesia Raya, Raden 
Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, who published the petition m  his news­
paper. Local newspapers in other cities took it over from 
Indonesia Raya. *I
As I did not yet know anything about military matters, I 
went to the Djawa Hsktfkai office on Djalan Geredja Theresia in 
order to ask for further advice on my project from its leaders. 
But they all kept silent. Indeed, Sartono said to me, "Dat is 
jouw eigen zaak" (ThatTs your business!). As for Bung Karno,
I could not get in touch with him at all. So I made up my mind 
to see Hadji Agus Salim, an intellectual who might possibly 
know something about military affairs. He promised to help, 
and asked me to go and see Mr. Supangkat, a lawyer, who lived 
on Djalan Tanah Abang.
Whereas I felt like crying on leaving the Djawa Hukukai 
office I now felt very much elated, and went straight to the 
house of Mr. Supangkat, who happened to be at home. I told him 
of my proposal to form a corps of volunteers and asked him what 
I should do next. I told him that I had received various let­
ters and postcards from people who were ready and willing to 
join the corps. Mr. Supangkat, who said he had already read 
all about it in Indonesia Raya, suggested that I submit another
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proposal urging that the volunteer troops later become an Army 
of National Defense that would fight within the borders of 
Indonesia. I therefore asked him to prepare that supplementary 
letter of petition, which he wrote in English. In the letter 
we pleaded that the volunteer corps should be a Volunteer Army 
for the Defense of the Fatherland, which could later become 
Indonesia1s National Army.
Carrying this supplementary letter of petition, I went to 
the Beppan office at Gambir 64 to find Mr. Yanagawa, who hap­
pened to be there with Captain I-ie, and I handed him the letter. 
From the Beppan office I went to the Karuhun pharmacy at Kramat 
to meet my friend Johan Diponegoro, who warmly welcomed me.
With Johan was another friend of mine, Surjadi, the commander 
of the Djakarta branch of the Indonesian National Scout movement 
(Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia, KBI) and the head of the KORA ad­
vertising bureau. The three of us agreed to agitate for the 
volunteer army. The next day I introduced these two friends of 
mine to Mr. Yanagawa, and for the purpose of our campaign we 
asked for a letter of testimonial, which Mr. Yanagawa immediately 
prepared for us.
Through the newspapers we informed people that those who 
wished to enlist in the Volunteer Army should send in their let­
ters of application to Djalan Kramat 11, Djakarta. Letters of 
support came from all over. Every week these letters were col­
lected and brought to the Beppan office as "proof" that my pro­
posal had received the enthusiastic support of many people.
About the beginning of October 1943 I received a summons, 
brought by Mr. Nagashima and Mr. Abdulhamid Ono, which said 
that my proposal on the formation of the volunteer defense army 
had been accepted and that I was to present myself at the Beppan 
office in order to meet General Harada and the Gunseikan, General 
Yamamoto, to be congratulated. At the General Staff office I 
heard that Bung Karno would automatically agree and that he 
would be summoned for this purpose by General Harada. Several 
days afterwards, I saw in the newspapers the picture of Bung 
Karno before General Harada, and a report that Bung Karno had 
agreed to the proposal and would give his support.
At the Beppan office I listened to a discussion to decide 
on the location of the training units (Kyuikutai and Renseitai), 
and learned that Bogor had been decided on as the center for this 
training. Then and there Mr. Yanagawa advised me to move to 
Bogor once they had found a house in that city for me and my 
family. In the meantime I had been travelling back and forth 
between Tjiandjur and Bogor. I joined in organizing the 
Kyaikutai department of the Renseitai (Training Unit) , and was 
told that Hadji Agus Salim and Mr. Sutan Prang Bustomi had been 
appointed to help in this. I took part in the first Daidanchu
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training course, which began in October.11 Most of the trainees 
were religious scholars, teachers, and members of the civil ser­
vice. Our training was climaxed by a march through Tjibadak- 
Sukabumi to Tjiandjur and then from Tjiandjur back to Bogor.
In all, 81 Daidan were organized, the last of them at Bomo, in 
the kawedanaan of Rogodjampi, Banjuwangi.
At the end of 1943, Sergeant Koba of the Bogor Kempeitai 
came to me and told me that a house had been found for me at 
Djalan Bioskop 15A in that city. I was appointed by the Bogor 
Shuchokan (Resident) to give training to Suishintai, Keibodan, 
and other officials who were quartered from time to time in 
Sukasari, Tjampaka, or Tjilendek (Bogor).1 2 Very often I asked 
for Mr. Togashifs assistance in training the Suishintai, Keibodan, 
etc. The Suishintai troops later became Barisan Pelopor and 
Barisan Banteng; they were sponsored by the Djawa H£>kT5kai and 
led by Supeno, Wikana, Sudiro, and others. At first I gave 
training to Barisan Pelopor people in the Bogor Shu, together 
with several middle-ranking PETA officers (Chudancho, Sjirifin,
0. Mochtan, Kosasih, Sukendro, Sabirin, etc.), and later Pelopor 
forces were trained in every Residency by PETA officers, so 
that there was a connection between the PETA and the Barisan 
Pelopor.13 14 Once the Saikosikikan, General Harada, personally 
witnessed the training at the Seinendojo camp at Sukasari. ltf
The Bogor Shuchokan also asked me to organize Remusha 
forces. At first I accepted the position of Romukyokucho (Head 
of the Office of Labor Affairs), but subsequently my feelings 
led me to hand this position over to Mr. Sasemita and his 
friends.15 I remained as instructor in military affairs, and
11. Daidancho was the term for a battalion commander with a rank 
somewhere between major and lieutenant-colonel. A Daidan 
was a battalion.
12. Suishintai (Promotion Corps) was an activist auxiliary of 
the Hokokai, whose members were given elementary training 
in drill with wooden rifles and assigned various propaganda 
and civil defense tasks. Keibodan (Vigilance Corps) was an 
auxiliary police unit.
13. Chudancho was the term for a company commander, next in the 
hierarchy below the Daidancho, with a rank roughly equiva­
lent to captain.
14. Saikosikikan--Supreme Commander. Seinendojo (Youth Training 
School) was a special school to train the select cadres for 
the inner core of PETA.
15. The Romusha program was notorious as a system of recruiting 
labor for defense construction projects in Indonesia and 
mainland Southeast Asia. The recruited laborers were often 
treated with appalling callousness and inhumanity.
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after the Hizbullah and Igokimmu forces were formed at Lembang 
(Bandung), I concurrently served as assistant instructor for 
them. I myself held the rank of Tokubetsu Daidancho, but did 
not belong to any Daidan.16 Because I was assigned to training 
Suishintai troops as well as teaching at the Renseitai, I often 
travelled outside Bogor.
I also helped form the Igokimmutai forces.17 They were led 
by PETA officers who had been trained in Lembang, Salatiga, and 
Malang to carry out a system of guerrilla warfare as in China, 
the idea being to form three Kidcrbutai (mobile forces) for West, 
Central, and East Java.18 In the hills near Tjiater, Salatiga, 
and Malang, places were prepared for storing equipment and food­
stuffs. Instructors were taken from the Kyoikutai and included 
Lt. Yabe, Abdullah Ono, Lt. Katsura, and Lt. Nagano; assistants, 
taken from several Daidan, included Chudancho Sutjipto, the 
late Sjirifin, Shodancho Otje Mochtan, Sukendro, Kosasih, 
Sabirin, and Moh. Saleh. Most of them are still active in the 
army, and their ranks are, at the lowest, Colonel or Brigadier- 
General. 19
The PETATs Name
When the volunteer army was formed it was not called PETA 
but just Tentara Sukarela. It was only after the middle of 
1944 that the change of name occurred, as the result of an 
initiative by Mr. Oto Iskandardinata and Jusuf Jahja to form 
a group to support the families of the volunteers (Badan Pembantu 
Keluarga Pradjurit Pembela Tanah Air). At that time Mr. Oto 
Iskandardinata began to popularize the name PETA for the volun­
teer defense army.
Thanks to the constant cultivation of the National Spirit 
in the PETA barracks by the Daidancho, Chudancho, and Shodancho,
16. Hizbullah— Army of Allah— units of Islamic youth given 
paramilitary training (see below). Tokubetsu Daidancho—  
Special Daidancho.
17. Igokimmutai--Special Task Force. It appears to have been 
formed as the result of a split in the Beppan between 
Lieutenant-Colonel Masugi and Captain Yanagawa, his subor­
dinate. Yanagawa was successful in having the Igokimmutai 
established under his own command, outside the Beppan hier­
archy. The two units were not reunited till Masugi was re­
placed by Colonel Obana in July 1945. The purpose of the 
Igokimmutai is explained in the text.
18. Kidobutai--shock troops (usually armored).
19. Shodancho— section commander, next in rank below the Chudancho 
in the PETA hierarchy, with a rank roughly equivalent to 
lieutenant.
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the PETA could not be Nipponized. Fights between PETA soldiers 
and Sakura people, and even between PETA and Keibitai troops 
often took place, e.g., at Tjirandjang, Tjikampek, and Depok, 
where the Sidakan received a bad mauling.20 PETA soldiers’ 
fights with the KeibSdan, who were fond of robbing the common 
folk of their rice, caused the people to regard them as their 
defenders. When we returned to our barracks after leave in the 
country, the villagers brought us all kinds of foodstuffs; they 
even supplied us with rice, although they themselves were run­
ning short. For confirmation of this, just ask Arudji Kartawinata, 
Muljadi Djojomartono, Kasman Singodimedjo, A. Latief Hendraningrat, 
Sutalaksana, Ibrahim Adjie, General Suharto himself, and others 
who were PETA soldiers in the Japanese time.
Bung Karno said in his autobiography that he knew before­
hand of the intention of the late Shodancho Suprijadi from the 
Blitar PETA to start an uprising against the Japanese. Although 
it is true that Bung Karno kept his house and family in Blitar,
I consider this claim incredible. In fact, at the session of 
the Chuo Sangi-in of June 18, 1945, Bung Karno condemned the 
Blitar PETA’s revolt.21 The person who did know of the plans 
beforehand was Sujono Rahardjo, who was assigned by Suprijadi 
and Muradi to contact the Daidans in East Java as far West as 
Madiun and Ponorogo. (He is still in the army and lives in 
Djakarta.) Suprijadi was very angry at various people from the 
Blitar Sakura and Sidokan, as well as the Kempeitai. He origin­
ally planned to begin the uprising while a large-scale war ex­
ercise was going on at Tuban; but the Japanese, sensing some­
thing, suddenly cancelled the exercise just when everything was 
ready. Up to now no one knows where Suprijadi was killed, be­
cause after the uprising at Blitar he headed for Kepandjen with 
his troops in order to make contact with the PETA in Malang. 
Suprijadi’s younger brother Supriatno, who lived for a long time 
with me when I was in Jogja during the revolution, went back 
and forth between Jogja and Blitar while organizing guerrilla 
forces among the people at Ngebruk and Ngoro; but he was unable 
to find where his elder brother was buried or where he had been 
killed.
A second clash with the Japanese was set off at the PETA 
barracks in Njomplon, Sukabumi, by Tjetje Subrata, a schoolteacher
20. Sidokan--trainer.
21. Chuo Sangi-in--Central Advisory Council— was the Japanese 
version of the pre-war Volksraad, a largely impotent pseudo­
representative body instituted to give an air of popular 
participation in an essentially colonial government. The 
uprising of sections of the Blitar Daidan took place under 
the leadership of Suprijadi in mid-February 1945. It was 
mercilessly crushed by the Japanese with the aid of various 
PETA units.
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of Djampang Kulon, just after he had returned from training under 
the leadership of myself and Shodancho 0. Mochtan. It is most 
regrettable that Tjetje Subrata afterward became a leader of the 
Bambu Runtjing and opposed the Indonesian army.
Such, in brief, is the account of the setting up the PETA 
during the Japanese occupation, for the sake of which I risked 
my personal wellbeing and life.
I Had No Intention to Sabotage 
or to Revolt
Truly, I had not the slightest idea of launching sabotage 
efforts or creating an uprising, or undertaking those other 
endeavors which are called underground activities. Once, when 
the Japanese army was already in possession of Java, I went to 
the house of Assistant Resident van der Kamp, who was then 
about to move to Tjipanas, as his house was to be occupied by 
Captain Shigeno. Mr. van der Kamp asked me, "Are you going to 
continue to press your claim for the independence of Indonesia?" 
"Yes, sir," I answered, "IT11 keep on demanding the independence 
of my country and my people, since thatfs a matter of principle 
for me. But, of course, Ifll take the legal road."
I doubt that during the period of Japanese rule in Indonesia 
a real underground organization existed. If such a movement had 
actually taken place, surely in twenty years of our independence 
someone would have written its history, and he would certainly 
have mentioned the names of its prime movers and the results of 
their efforts. But the fact is that until now no one at all 
has written about such an organization. There was the uprising 
led by the late Suprijadi, Dr. Ismangil, Muradi, Suparjono,
Halir, Sunanto, Sudarmo, and others; but this occurred after 
the PETA had been formed and arose from developments within it 
rather than from some group operating outside. The same was true 
of the rebellions of PETA officers at Purwakarta, Dengklok, 
Segalaherang, Pegaden, and Pangkalan.
This holds also for the organization supposedly established 
by the late Sutan Sjahrir, who is described in Bung Karno’s auto­
biography as having made an agreement with the collaborating 
Indonesian leaders to set up an "underground movement." In my 
opinion this is doubtful. Sutan Sjahrir was not in the least 
willing to work with Indonesian government leaders any more than 
he was willing to work with the Japanese. He lived in extremely 
straitened circumstances. Sometimes he put up at a friend’s 
house at Kepuh, sometimes at Krukut, and once in a while he came 
to Tjiandjur or to Garut to Mr. Sastra’s house. He had very 
strong objections to working with the Japanese, but does it fol­
low that he was therefore capable of carrying on underground 
activities other than airing his views? I never heard of any, 
even after we gained our freedom. Who undertook an underground 
movement at that time and how, nobody knows.
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Hizbullah Troops
About the second half of 1944, when the rainy season had 
set in, a conference of leaders of the Djawa Hukukai from all 
over Java was held in the movie theater of the Zoological Gar­
den at Kebon Sirih. Via Mr. Raden Suradiredja, who at that 
time was the head of the economic bureau at the Bogor Shuchokan’s 
office, I received an invitation to attend the meeting, which 
I accepted. I had no idea what would be talked about at the 
conference, as I did not belong to the Board of the Djawa 
HSkcflcai. I was present only at the general meeting at Taman 
Kebon Sirih, and there I learned that the Djawa Hakcfcai intended 
to send a petition to the Saikosikikan, General Harada, asking 
that a conscriptive militia be introduced. Bung Karno, who made 
a fiery speech in support of Dai Nippon, ended by asking the 
audience to stand up if they agreed with the proposal. I did 
not agree, so I remained in my seat. I felt that everyone’s 
eyes were upon me, but I did not pay attention to it.
Finally a procession was formed, with Bung Karno at the 
head of the line, accompanied by Mr. Shimizu and carrying a let­
ter of petition. It began to rain. As time wore on, the rain 
grew heavier and heavier, and I was forced to seek shelter in 
front of the building, waiting for the downpour to stop so that 
I could go back to the house where I was spending the night with 
Mr. Suradiredja. Mr. Suradiredja had joined in the procession, 
which headed for the residence of General Harada, which is now 
Merdeka Palace.
The following day, Sidik Djojosukarto and Sudiro (who was 
usually called "Mbah") came to see me on behalf of Bung Karno 
and asked for a written explanation as to why I did not agree 
with the conscription proposal. I immediately sat down to com­
pose a statement of my reasons. In the letter I expressed my 
deep regret that Bung Karno had altered his earlier principles 
on conscription; he had changed and was no longer the same as 
in the time of the Indonesian Nationalist Party under the Dutch.
A few days later, back in Bogor, I met with Mr. Yanagawa 
at his home, located just opposite the PETA barracks (which had 
housed Battalion 14- in the time of the Dutch) , and I told him 
about the conscription proposal. At the end of our talk, which 
was witnessed by Lieutenant Yabe, it occurred to me that many 
Indonesian youths, especially those of the Islamic religious 
schools (pesantren and madrasah), were still hesitant about the 
Suishintai or Seinendan; if they could be mobilized by giving 
them training of their own, this might substitute for a conscrip­
ted militia.22 So I proposed, if they agreed, to form a force *25
22. Seinendan--Youth Corps— was a paramilitary !fboy-scoutn type 
of organization limited to youths between the ages of 18 and
25. Many of its members were subsequently drawn into the 
ranks of the PETA.
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of Islamic youth (I was a member of the Muhammadjah and in 
Tjiandjur I occupied the vice-chairmanship of the local branch). 
Mr. Yanagawa and Mr. Yabe promptly accepted, and promised to 
talk it over with the General.
Thus, at the beginning of September 1944, the first bat­
talion of Islamic troops was formed. Kiai Hadji Achmad Sanusi, 
who occupied the post of the Bogor Vice-Resident at that time, 
suggested that this battalion be called the !tBarisan Hizbullah 
Sabilillah." Kiai Hadji Achmad Sanusi also asked Captain 
Yanagawa that if the Hizbullah were formed it should not be re­
quired, if at all possible, that the Saikeirei be performed on 
the occasion of raising the Nipponese flag, and that instead it 
would be sufficient to cry out trAllahu Akbarn three times.23
We did not get any approval for our project whatsoever from 
the Djawa Htfkukai, only from the All-Indonesia Islamic Council 
(MIAI) and the Masjumi.24 25 But the first battalion was formed, 
at the village of Tjisalak, in the ketjamatan Tjibarusa, Bogor.
At the ceremony officially inaugurating its military training 
various Djakarta leaders were present, among them Kiai Wachid 
Hasjim, Kiai Achmad Surkati, and Kiai Faturrachman. From Bogor 
came Kiai Hadji Achmad Sanusi, Raden Hadji Hasbullah, Kiai 
Fallak, and Raden Hadji Mahmud (the penghulu of Tjibarusa).
Muslim youth came from all the regencies of West Java, the 
largest number being some sixty young men brought from Tasikmalaja 
by Hadji Djunaedi and his friends.25
At first the military training periods were planned to last 
four months, but this proved insufficient, and the first one 
had to be extended for another three, that is until the begin­
ning of April 1945. Among the officers leading this program 
were Messrs. Yanagawa, Ono, Katsura, and Yabe.
23. The Saikeirei was the bow of obeisance in honor of the 
Japanese Emperor which was obligatory on all public occa­
sions. It aroused deep resentment, particularly on the part 
of devout Moslems, who felt it approximated too closely the 
religious bow in the direction of Mecca.
24. M.I.A.I. (Madjlisul Islamil a Tlaa Indonesia) was set up in 
Surabaja in September 1937 as a kind of Islamic unity front. 
It was sponsored both by the urban, entrepreneurial 
Muhammadijah and the rural, landowning Nahdatul Ulama. When 
the Japanese replaced the M.I.A.I. by a more centralized 
organization, the Masjumi (Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia), 
in November 1943, the Muhammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama con­
tinued as the new federations most important constituent 
elements.
25. Wachid Hasjim and Faturrachman were prominent Nahdatul Ulama 
leaders, while Sanusi and Djunaedi were wellknown figures
in the Muhammadijah.
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At a farewell party held at the end of the training for the 
young soldiers from Tasikmalaja at the Bogor Shuchokan office, I, 
as the sole speaker, called on the youths to remain devoted to 
their religious teachings in addition to strengthening their 
spirit of nationalism as Hizbullah troops. I told them they 
must hold firmly to the path of justice, and, without realizing 
what I was saying, I added that, "We shall attack even the 
Japanese if they behave unjustly." What I said seemed to startle 
tjie Indonesians among the audience, but the Japanese present did 
not pay the least attention to it, and the leave-taking party 
continued smoothly and safely.
A second Hizbullah battalion was formed at Kediri, and I 
remember having spent the night there at the house of a young 
man by the name of Mohamad Saleh, who also took part in the 
military training. After that a Hizbullah battalion was formed 
in every kabupaten, its leadership later being taken over by 
the MIAI (Masjumi) command.
This, in brief, is my account of the formation of the Hiz­
bullah troops during the Japanese time. It was also one of my 
contributions, in the sense that the proposal occurred to me 
and that both the Hizbullah and PETA troops were the result of 
my reaction to the proposal for conscription, which I believed 
would be a disaster for a people still under colonial rule.
Many of the PETA and Hizbullah instructors are still alive, and 
some have visited Indonesia since. Among these are Mr. Yanagawa, 
Mr. Abdulhamid Ono, Mr. N. Narusawa, Mr. Taguchi, and Mr. Maruzaki, 
the captain who cut off his little finger for losing his bet.
Mr. Togashi, Mr. Rokugawa, Mr. Katsura, Mr. Yabe, and Mr. Nagano 
are also still living; they reside in Japan and have mostly be­
come businessmen.
Expression of Thanks
On this occasion I do not forget to express my heartfelt 
gratitude to all the religious leaders, teachers, physicians, civil 
service officials, and young students who enlisted as volunteers in 
the PETA, because their spontaneous willingness to join the army 
saved me from the personal disaster which might have befallen 
me if my proposal to set up the PETA had not been successful.
Also to the instructors, among them Messrs. M. Yanagawa,
Abdulhamid Ono, Yabe, Katsura, Narusawa, Nagano, Togashi, and 
Nagashima. I extend my sincere thanks, because only by their 
perserverance, strict discipline, and correct conduct could a 
Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland be forged and 
welded together, an army which, together with the people, fought 
bravely for Indonesian independence. My boundless thanks are 
also due to the young men of the Hizbullah units and to the 
Muslim leaders of the All-Indonesia Islamic Council (M.I.A.I.) 
and the Masjumi in Djakarta, as well as to Hadji Djunaedi of 
Tasikmalaja, who painstakingly helped in the formation of the 
Hizbullah corps.
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The personal dedication and conviction which I had expressed 
before the Japanese officers from the Sambo Beppan at Gambir 64 
in Djakarta, at the risk of my life, is the first reason why I 
do not wish someone else to claim that the PETA was his work or 
creation and that I merely served as someone who had been given 
orders to set it up. Secondly, I was determined to save young 
Indonesians from joining an army which might be sent beyond the 
borders of their homeland as cannon fodder for the Allied Forces. 
And this applied not only to the young men of Indonesian blood, 
who were called Genjumin in Japanese, but also to the youth of 
mixed parentage, like the Eurasians, Indonesian-Arabs, or 
Indonesian-Chinese, whom the Japanese also labelled Genjumin.26
Indonesian National Army Succeeded
After Independence was declared, the desire to form an 
Indonesian National Army from the PETA became a reality.27 I 
had first expressed this hope in the session of the Chuo Sangi- 
in at Pedjambon, Djakarta, if I am not mistaken on June 18, 1945, 
about two weeks after Bung Karno made a speech on the Pantja 
Dharma.28 How did this come about?
One day late in May 1945, Mr. Ichibangase, the head of the 
Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, 
accompanied by Dr. Toha and Kiai Hadji Abdul Halim, members of 
the Chiro Sangi-in, came to see me.29 They were on their way to
26. GenjUmin— natives--had definitely derogatory connotations.
In May 1945, when the Japanese authorities had decided to 
move towards creating an independent Indonesia, official 
instructions were issued that the use of this term should 
henceforth be avoided.
27. This should not be interpreted as indicating that there was 
any organizational continuity between the PETA (which was 
disbanded in the first week after the Proclamation of In­
dependence) and the Indonesian National Army. But many ex­
officers and soldiers from the PETA did join the National 
Army and formed an important nucleus within it.
28. The Pantja Dharma— The Five Duties--was a rather vague declar­
ation of nationalist aspirations and devotion to the Japanese 
cause drawn up at the Chuo Sangi-inTs sixth plenary session 
(November 12-18, 1944). Never very popular, the Pantja 
Dharma was explicitly disavowed by Sukarno in favor of the 
Pantja Sila in his famous speach of June 1, 1945 to the 
Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Inde­
pendence .
29. Ichibangase was the Japanese Resident of Tjirebon and Vice- 
Chairman of the Study Committee mentioned above.
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Tjirebon. Ichibangase handed me a message from the Gunseikan 
asking me to come to the Chuo Sangi-in session on June 18, 19*45, 
which would celebrate Dai Nippon Teikokufs promise to give in­
dependence to Indonesia. The message also requested me to de­
liver a speech about the PETA, because at the session there 
would be messages from the Saikosikikan and the Gunseikan about 
how to win the Greater East Asia War, how to liberate the Asian 
countries, and how we were all resolved and determined to be 
independent.
I remember that it was only possible for me to speak in the 
supplementary session, after the messages of the Saikosikikan, 
General Harada, and the Gunseikan, General Yamamoto. In my 
speech I expressed full determination to win the war and to pre­
pare for Indonesian independence, and I declared my fervent hope 
that the Boei Giyugun would later grow into an Indonesian National 
Army. I explained that we had been busy organizing military 
training of the Suishintai, Seinendan, Keibodan, government 
officials, and village people, I still remember that two new 
members of the Chuo Sangi-in attended that session, namely Ir. 
Darmawan Mangunkusumo and Mr. Suprodjo. Also, two new deputy 
Gicho (chairmen) were appointed to succeed Mr. R. M. Kusumo 
Utojo, who had resigned--Drs. Mohamad Hatta and Raden Oto 
Iskandardinata.
Several days after that session, the members of the Chuo 
Sangi-in were housed at the Daidan barracks in Petodjo for two 
days1 training. They were drilled in marching, taught how to 
use a rifle, and so on. Bung Karno and Bung Hatta also joined 
in this basic military training. Those who did not were Dr. 
Radjiman, Mr. Singgih, and several aged and sick persons.
Following the Chuo Sangi-in session I was called to the 
office of the Gunseikan, and there I learned that I would be 
included in a delegation of Chuo Sangi-in members who were to 
leave for Tokyo. The group was to be headed by Mr. Abdurachman 
Saleh and Mr. Masuda from the Study Committee, whose office was 
situated near the present KPM building. In the end the delega­
tion did not go, as the journey to Japan had become more and 
more hazardous.
In his autobiography. Bung Karno described the events con­
cerning the Proclamation of Independence, which had been forced on 
him at Rengasdengklok by the pressure of the young revolution­
aries Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, Malik, Noor, and others. The 
validity of his account can be checked not only with Sukarni 
and Adam Malik but also by various former PETA officers who are 
now still serving in the army, among them Mustafa Kemal, Marwoto, 
Samirahardjo, Safari, Dachjar, Darwis, Tjetjep Prawira,
Suharjana, and Oja Somantri and K. H. Iljas, all of whom played 
an important role in the struggle at Purwakarta and Krawang.
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The first real battle of the revolution occurred at Bogor, 
in the neighborhood of Depok, on the night of October 11, 1945.
I was then commander of the Bogor BKR. Together with Duleh 
Abdullah, Affandi, Sofjan, Otje Mochtan, Saptadji, and Sjirifin 
(all former PETA officers), and assisted by Pelopor troops and 
local people, we attacked Gurkha forces coming from the direc­
tion of Parungpandjang through Tjiseeng. The incident was wit­
nessed by Raden Enoch Danubrata, the police chief of Bogor, and 
also by a number of officers still serving in the army, but who 
at that time were assigned to other territories, namely, Abu 
Kahar, Abu Umar, Djunaedi, .Dahlan, Mufraeni, Djaelani, Sabirin, 
Adjen, Abd. Salam, and other former PETA people. We gained 
the victory, but three of our men were killed, among them 
Sumardja from the Tjiomas Pelopor, the youth Margonda (missing 
in action), a policeman and a member of the local population.
They were all buried on October 12, 1945, at Taman Bunga Cemetery 
in front of the Bogor railway station. The Gurkha troops escaped 
to Djakarta via Tjisalak because their path was not blocked in 
time. This occurred because of the carelessness of the troops 
of Bapak Matjem and Hadji Daud, who came from Tjileungsi through 
Tjibinong. They arrived late because they had been very much 
tempted to commit robbery at Gunung Puteri.
I Was Seized
As a result of the Depok clash and the murder of several 
Dutch leaders in Bogor by young revolutionaries, I was summoned 
to Djakarta together with four friends— Duleh Abdullah, Basuki 
(a judge), Kustio, and Ambijah— in order, we heard, to talk 
with Colonel Harding, who wanted to arrange for the Allied Forces 
to have the Bogor Palace for their headquarters and the Battalion 
14 camp for their Gurkha troops. We were fetched for the trip 
by a Colonel Greenway, who brought us first to the Hotel des 
Indes. We were not called in for discussion^, however, but 
were thrown instead into Glodok prison and later, in January 
1946, were moved to Onrust Island in the bay of Djakarta.
At Onrust I was tried as a war criminal and collaborator 
and was sentenced to fifteen years1 imprisonment. Indeed, I 
had given aid to the Japanese, but in a positive Indonesian 
nationalist spirit, defending Justice and Humanitarianism, and 
not in the spirit of a "servant of Japan," not in the spirit 
of "Inggris kita linggis, Amerika kita setrika."30 Hence it 
is my view, down to this> day, that the judgment against me as 
a collaborator was completely unwarranted and that they did not 
understand my whole life's purpose. I was tried by Mr. Beer,
30. This was a famous slogan of Sukarno's in his radio broad­
casts during the war years. It meant "Let’s use a crow­
bar on the English, and crush the Americans with a flat­
iron ."
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Mr. Dendam, and Mr. Pieters. A Dutch judge advocate was also 
present. After the trial, those who had interrogated me shook 
my hand and thanked me for having rejected conscription, for by 
this act Eurasian youths had been saved from possible recruit­
ment into the Japanese forces. They all wished me well.
One day in June 1947 I was called to the prison administra­
tion office and learned that I was completely free again but 
was not allowed to remain in the Dutch-occupied area. If mem­
bers of my family wanted to follow me to the Republic, priority 
would be given so that all our baggage could be brought along.
I chose to move to Jogja.
In Jogja, I was employed at the Ministry of Defense, which 
Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin headed at that time, and was appointed to 
assist Major-General Ir. Sakirman, the head of the Ministry's 
political education bureau (Pepolit), with the rank of' Lieutenant- 
Colonel. Together with Major-General Djoko Sungkono and Major- 
General Djoko Sujono, I attempted to re-establish the system of 
defense territories (Wehrkreise) according to the Daidan system 
of the Japanese period. I had difficulty, however, with my eyes, 
having become afflicted with cataracts during my imprisonment.
I was treated frequently in the Panti Rapih hospital and then in 
the eye hospital of Dr. Yap. I was forced to have an operation, 
and when I returned to duty it was after Hatta had become Prime 
Minister. He appointed me chairman of the Badan Koordinasi 
Gabungan Perdjuangan Rakjat di Djawa dan Madura (Joint Coordin­
ating Body for People's Struggle in Java and Madura), which was 
to supervise and coordinate the efforts of about 48 lasjkar—  
organizations of irregular guerrilla troops— including sailors, 
in order to make their struggle more efficient.
When the Indonesian Communist Party attempted its coup, I 
was sent to Madiun, Ponorogo, Magetan, and Plaosan to give guid­
ance to the people; I was joined in this by Resident Sanusi 
Hardjadinata and the Military Police Corps under Major Rusli.
At the time of the second Dutch attack, I myself saw General 
Sudirman come out of the Palace and pass through Djalan 
Panggurakan. At Ngabean he called out, "Follow me." It was a 
Sunday. I was together with Captain Marjono and Sabilal Rasjad 
at Ngabean, near the post office, while the stronghold in front 
of the Jogjakarta palace was being bombed.31 Bung Karno did not 
leave with General Sudirman but let himself be captured by the 
Dutch. If the Indonesian people had followed Bung Karno's foot­
steps, there would not have been a Republic of Indonesia. His 
love for country and people stayed only on his lips. In his
31. The reference is to the airborne attack on Jogjakarta by
Dutch troops at dawn on December 19, 1948, which opened the 
Second Military Action. The "stronghold" referred to is the 
old Beteng or Fortress, where Dutch troops had been stationed 
during the colonial period.
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heart of hearts, he did not hesitate to sacrifice them for his 
personal interests. The country headed toward bankruptcy, and 
lo! Bung Karno became a millionaire. Where did all those 
riches come from???
During the second clash I was in Gunung Kidul, the defense 
territory of General Suharto (he was a Captain at the time).
The regular army was under his command; I myself coordinated the 
irregulars, which were under the direct command of Komaruddin, 
who led the Hizbullah troops stationed at Djederan, and Captain 
Martono and Basuki, GPI commanders stationed at Imogiri. I 
took up my headquarters in Terong and had contact chiefly with 
these two forces, as well as the Military Police under the com­
mand of Captain Herman and Lieutenant Sukirno, and the PPPRI 
forces under the late Suparno. I also worked with Lt. Colonel 
Hasanuddin Pasopati of the PI, who was killed when attacking 
NICA troops at Barongan, and D. Suparta of the Department of 
Information.
When the army ran out of money, I helped with the printing 
of Rp. 25 and Rp. 75 banknotes at Panggang/Plosok, where Brother 
Mustopha, also called Lengkong, had made available his printery 
to Captain Trisno Sudomo. We were able to steal a hand press 
from Jogja with the help of youths from Wiloso Prodjo and village 
officials of Muntuk and Imogiri. Printing materials were first 
collected by Ibu Gatot and kept at Djalan Purwanggan 7 at the 
place of a maidservant named Ijem, from which they could easily 
be brought past the Dutch military outposts in Sentul and 
Kotagede to the hills. Printing was done with the assistance 
of Harun, Miss Sri, and Miss Garmini (who is now a Lieutenant 
in the COWAD in Djakarta).32 In the first month we printed 
about 38,000 notes and in the second about 40,000. The money 
circulated as far as Tjirebon. We were able to get authoriza­
tion for printing the notes from Kasimo, the Minister of Economics 
for the Republic, who happened to have been brought in by the 
guerrilla army from the Magelang area.
When Colonel Nasution ordered the irregular troops to join 
or hand over their arms to the Indonesian National Army, I helped 
advise the irregulars to turn in their weapons to Lieutenant 
Darsono, who was under the command of Captain Suharto at that 
time. I myself never met Captain Suharto, though we were both 
in Gunung Kidul. We received material support in this 
guerrilla period from Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono, who furnished 
us with paper to print the banknotes, and from Pangeran Honggo- 
wongso. R. M. Darsono and Supardjo acted as our liaison with 
them. We also had contact with Pangeran Surjaningprang of the 
Pakualaman. Indeed, his house became a headquarters for the 
guerrillas who slipped into Jogja city.
32. COWAD— Corps Wanita Angkatan Darat— is the Women’s Corps 
in the present-day Indonesian Army.
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While in Gunung Kidul I fell ill of the bubonic plague and 
was nursed by Dr. R. Irsan until I had completely recovered. 
Thereafter I lived in Muntuk until January 1950, when the war 
ended and I returned to Jogja. I had been made a member of the 
KNIP, and as such joined in the ratification of the Round Table 
Conference agreement at Siti Inggil, Jogja, and in naming Sukarno 
President of the RIS (Republic of the United States of Indonesia).33
After the negotiations with the Dutch were completed, I was 
employed in Jogjakarta at the Secretariat of the Indonesian Na­
tionalist Party. In 1952 I moved to Djakarta in order to take 
up the post of General Secretary of the PNI. The following year 
I left the party, moved to Bandung, and established the Gerakan 
Pembela Pantjasila (Pantjasila Defense Movement) in response to 
the increasing terrorist activities of the Tentara Islam Indonesia 
(Indonesian Islamic Army) in West Java. I was a member of Parlia- 
from 1954 until 1959, when it was dissolved by Presidential de­
cree, and was then pensioned off.
In September 1958 I proposed the formation of a "Staatspartei," 
a single state political organization, directly under the leader­
ship of the President with the Pantjasila as its principle, in 
order to reduce the numerous parties in Indonesia. President 
Sukarno, thinking the time had not come for such a drastic re­
duction, rejected this concept and instead formed the National 
Front, which, having no political base of its own, was sterile.
After 1959 I had no further contact with my former comrades in 
the struggle, who continued to hold high positions, nor did I 
meet with President Sukarno again. I did not have the courage 
to approach them, for I felt myself only an unimportant person.
I was appointed a member of the MPRS (Provisional People’s Con­
sultative Assembly) in 1960, but left it in 1967 at the time of 
the rejuvenation of the MPRS membership by the West Java repre­
sentative ass embly.
This is the sum of my correction of Bung Karno’s story as 
it was written down by Mrs. Cindy Adams. I should like to point 
out once again that I do not intend by this to sabotage Bung 
Karno, but only to show that history must not be distorted. I 
greatly regret that Bung Karno who, at the time his autobiography 
was written, still had authority and influence and was respected, 
could go so far as to tell things that were not true, only be­
cause he liked so much to boast.
Translated by Harumi Wanasita Evans 
______________  and Ruth McVey
33. The KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat— Central Indonesian 
National Committee) was the functional equivalent of a 
parliament in the Republican governmental system up to the 
formal transfer of sovereignty.
